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Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500160001-7

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Strategic Warning and Crisis Management Staff

FROM:

John F. Blake  
Deputy Director for Administration

EXTENSION

NO.

DDA 76-4663

Executive Registry

DATE

20 SEP 1976

76-501513

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

DDCI

2.

3.

4.

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25X1A

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Hank:

In your memorandum of 19 August 1976 to the members of the Executive Advisory Group, you asked that the DDA take under consideration the problem of staffing of a strategic warning and crisis management staff. I discussed this matter with Jim Taylor, who stated that he felt that this was a problem that the Comptroller might more appropriately address. I am, therefore, forwarding to you the Comptroller's response, which indicates the problems inherent in establishing the staff.

John F. Blake  
Deputy Director  
for  
Administration

Attachment

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY

4-2.1.1

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FORM  
3-62

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COMPT 76-1191

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SSA-DD/A Registry
76-6724
15 SEP 1976

DD/A Registry
76-4663

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director for Administration

THROUGH : Comptroller

SUBJECT : Review of Strategic Warning Staff and Support of It by Agency Elements

REFERENCE : Memo to DDCI from Cord Meyer, Jr., dtd. 12 Aug 76,  
Same Subject

1. The Strategic Warning Staff (SWS) "staffing problem", described in the referenced paper, deserves some careful consideration. Strategic warning is, of course, a very vital function of longstanding concern to this Agency and to the Intelligence Community. Over the years there has been considerable debate over the extent to which this function could be carried out effectively by those who are regularly involved in other aspects of intelligence analysis. However, the concensus has been, and I believe still is, that: (a) this is basically a community function, and (b) it requires the regular analytical efforts of a small but well-qualified interagency team dedicated exclusively to the problem of strategic warning.

2. I can appreciate the advantages of establishing a formal TO with the required positions for this staff which would be filled by Community representatives as well as some number of CIA analysts. This would allow the Director of SWS to exercise greater control over the selection of individuals for this staff and would demonstrate a commitment by the DCI and DDCI to strengthen the effort against the strategic warning problem.

3. As to the number of positions, I would agree that ten or so seems to be an ideal number for this interagency staff. For our part, this Agency already has four slots (including the Chief) allocated to this effort. 25X1A With the two DIA, two NSA, and one Air Force analysts already on board and the Army and Marine Corps personnel (one each) being added, the Staff will have a total strength of ten professionals/military officers plus one clerical.

4. Under Cord Meyer's proposal, the SWS would be placed in the DCI area, presumably under the Special Assistant to the DCI for Strategic Warning. In this event, the four CIA positions presently allocated to this effort (in OCI) could be readily transferred. Unfortunately, the prospects for coming up with the six new positions needed, at this particular time, are just about nil in view of the extremely tight position situation which this Agency has for 1977.

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5. On the other hand, with the number of analysts already on board and being added to the SWS, I don't get a sense of great urgency for the proposed change in staffing. While it is really too late to include this request for positions in our 1977 Operating Plan or 1978 OMB Budget, it could be given a high priority for 1978, if the DDCI deems this appropriate.

6. Another alternative would be to look to the IC Staff to absorb this activity because of its interagency make-up and community-wide responsibility. But I am not optimistic that such an arrangement could be worked out anytime soon.

[Redacted Signature]

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Assistant Comptroller, Resources

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Executive Registry

76-5015/1

COMPT

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DD/A Registry

76-4195

19 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the Executive Advisory Group

1. Attached is a very interesting first-cut report from Cord Meyer who is, as you know, looking into strategic warning and crisis management areas. Cord's report is circulated for your information.

2. There are a few actions worth considering. With regard to paragraph 2, the DDI is requested to develop ways and means to stress the importance of strategic warning among those analysts whose duties embrace the warning function. The DDI is also requested to encourage a more active SWS in seeking input and views from the Agency.

3. With regard to the staffing problem described in paragraph 3 and Cord's recommendation, the DDA is requested to take this matter under consideration and give me his advice. ✓

[Redacted Signature]

E. H. Knoche

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

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Attachment:

ER 76/5015

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12 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Cord Meyer, Jr.

SUBJECT : Review of Strategic Warning Staff and  
Support of It by Agency Elements

1. Per your request I have reviewed the functions of the Special Assistant to the DCI for Strategic Warning and the Strategic Warning Staff. In the course of this review I have consulted with [redacted] and the heads of those offices within the Agency which support and work with SWS. My conclusions are as follows:

a. Adequacy of the SWS Basic Charter as Contained in DCID 1/5 - There is general agreement that a small and qualified staff, such as SWS, should be focused on the specific problem of strategic warning defined as the threat of attack by the Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact, China and North Korea. In spite of the unlikelihood of such an event we must afford the luxury of a small and expert group with this responsibility in view of its importance to our over-all mission. The location of the staff in the Pentagon has worked satisfactorily, as has General Faurer as Special Assistant to the DCI.

b. Access to All-Source Intelligence in the Strategic Warning Field - The staff has access to all the information that it feels it needs from DIA, NSA and from the components of the Agency. One gap is the unavailability [redacted] traffic from State but there is no solution to this problem other than to proceed as you are doing with the top levels at State.

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c. Publications - The monthly SWS Report and the weekly Alert List show that the staff is alert to new developments and techniques in the strategic warning field and the publications seem to be well received and responded to by customers both in the military and in the Agency.

d. Periodic Review of SWS by the Strategic Warning Review Group - Periodic review is called for by DCID 1/5 and the most recent review was conducted 11 June 1976, copy attached. I have found nothing to cause me to disagree with its findings.

2. Suggestions were made for additional activity by SWS. The Director of OCI admits that over time there may have been some atrophy in the sense of responsibility for strategic warning by the analysts and he would welcome the assistance of the Director of SWS in a seminar or series of briefings bringing them up to date on developments in this field. In addition the Acting Deputy Director of OSR suggested that the Director of SWS might be more active in seeking input from the Community and stated that OSR would be glad to contribute studies on specific issues in the strategic warning field.

3. Staffing Problem - DCID 1/5 states in general terms that the members of NFIB will "provide full-time senior professional intelligence personnel" to the SWS, but there seems to be no other formal document defining the over-all size of the staff or requiring NFIB members to provide a specified number of people at a particular grade. General Faurer and [ ] first Director of SWS, agreed to the need for a professional staff of 10 analysts in addition to the Director. This number reflected a desire to have broad community representation, but to stay within the general requirement that the staff be kept small. The plan was to have two representatives from CIA, DIA and NSA, and one from State and each of the Services. In the 18 months of its existence, the SWS has operated with six or seven analysts on duty. At present, the on-board complement in addition to the Director is:

DIA	0-6* & GS-15
NSA	GS-14 & GS-12
CIA	GS-13
Air Force	0-5

\*Serves as Deputy Director of SWS

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In addition the Army has designated an O-4 who will report on 13 September and the Marine Corps has volunteered to assign an officer. Both Navy and State remain reluctant to participate.

Both General Faurer and [ ] believe that the formal establishment of a Table of Organization with the required slots would be of great assistance. All offices that now contribute personnel to the staff must use one of their own slots for the assigned individual, and in the case of smaller components this can work a real hardship. Somewhat longer assignments would be beneficial to the staff and would be easier for an agency to make if it could retain and temporarily refill its slot. The Special Assistant and the Director of SWS would have a stronger hand in the selection of people with a resultant improvement in quality. There is unanimous agreement among all those consulted that such a change would be beneficial to the staff, if the slots can be found.

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Recommendation: Consideration should be given to the establishment of ten slots under the DCI for the SWS.

[ ]

Cord Meyer, Jr. ✓

25X1A

Attachment: As stated

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